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1 Introduction
This article examines the political and economic
processes governing Ethiopian cereal seed
systems. It does this by analysing the overall
policy context, along with the main interests
driving seed policy formulation and
implementation and the roles and interaction of
the different public and private actors. It also
examines how these interests and interactions
are related to the performance of the system on
the ground.
By focusing on three key political economic
drivers of change within the seed system – state
control, market liberalisation and
decentralisation – the article asks: How are seed
related policies and implementation guidelines
created? How do ideas about what makes ‘good’
policy and implementation guidelines evolve and
change over time? Whose voices and views are
taken into account in the policy process? What
are the key arguments for the choice of actions?
What spaces exist for new ideas, actors and
networks, and how can these be opened up? And
finally, what urgent national/regional seed policy
issues and processes need to be considered for
creation of a vibrant seed system within the
country?
2 Ethiopia’s seed system
Along with the establishment of the formal
agricultural research system in the late 1950s,
the formal seed system in Ethiopia started with
public sector support, mainly targeting the then
state-owned farms. Even following the era of
market liberalisation in the early 1990s, the
formal seed system is still dominated by the
public sector, although different actors, including
the private sector, with different incentives and
motives are playing increasingly important roles.
The seed sector is of paramount importance to
Ethiopia. It plays a dominant role in the
economy, representing about 45 per cent of the
GDP and 85 per cent of export earnings, with
the livelihoods of 85 per cent of the population of
79 million people being primarily based on
agriculture. The real GDP for Ethiopia has risen
by 48 per cent, in real terms since 2002/03 and
this economic growth has been strongly
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associated with the good performance of the
agricultural sector, particularly from 2004 (FAO
and WFP 2008). There are multiple reasons for
this growth, including area expansion along with
an upward trend in input use (mainly improved
seeds, fertiliser and other agro-chemicals)
(Beyene Tadesse 2008; Byerlee et al. 2007). The
state pursues an Agricultural Development Led
Industrialisation (ADLI) strategy, and
agriculture is central to the current Growth and
Transformation Plan (GTP), which targets to
double agricultural production by 2015 mainly
through scaling up the productivity level of
smallholder farmers/pastoralists to the
productivity level of model farmers.
According to the Central Statistical Agency of
Ethiopia (CSA 2009) about 12 million
smallholder farmers were engaged in the
production of cereal crops in the 2008/09
production season and cereals covered 78 per
cent (8.8 million ha) of the total grain crop area.
Among cereal crops, teff, maize, wheat and
sorghum were dominant (Table 1).
By contrast with other countries in Africa,
including those discussed in other articles in this
IDS Bulletin, Ethiopia is highly reliant on
informal seed provision and local varieties. In
Ethiopia, most seeds are supplied through an
informal seed system where there is no legal
certification. This includes retained seed by
farmers, farmer-to-farm seed exchange and
cooperative or NGO-based seed multiplication
and distribution. During the 2008 main meher
growing season, it is estimated that at least 95
per cent of all seeds used were local seeds carried
over from the previous harvest either by the
farmers themselves (through the traditional on-
farm selection process, whereby the farmer
identifies next year’s seed stock while it is still
maturing in the field, and gives it special
protection) or by buying from preferred seed
stock kept by other farmers in the same locality
(FAO and WFP 2008).
The formal seed system, on the other hand, is a
system that involves the production and
distribution of basic seed, mainly by the research
system or certified multipliers (like ESE, the
regional seed enterprises, as well as recently
licensed private seed companies like ANO and
Agri-Ceft Ethiopia) and certified seed by public
seed enterprises and private seed companies.
The average contribution of the formal seed
sector as a percentage of cultivated land was only
4.3 per cent in 2008, with considerable variability
among different crops. Among the major cereals,
19 per cent of the maize area, 6 per cent of the
wheat area and under 1 per cent of teff areas
were covered with seed from the formal sectors
(NSPDC 2009). The role of different actors in
the formal seed system is summarised in Table 2.
Seed policy is also being influenced by donors
who are interested in strengthening the national
seed system through different programmes.
These include the Program for Africa’s Seed
System (PASS), of the Alliance for a Green
Revolution in Africa (AGRA), an initiative of the
Bill & Melinda Gates and Rockefeller
Foundations, and the Agricultural Growth
Program (AGP) of the World Bank (2009),
specifically targeting the Ethiopian seed system
through technical support and investment. Seed
policy issues at the regional level are also being
addressed. For example, the Association for
Strengthening Agricultural Research in Eastern
and Central Africa (ASARECA), which
represents the National Agricultural Research
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Table 1 Importance of cereals in terms of area and production (2008/09 production season)
Crop Area Production
Ha (millions) Grain land (%) Qt (millions) Grain production (%)
Teff 2.5 22.13 30.28 17.69
Maize 1.8 15.77 39.32 22.97
Wheat 1.5 12.97 25.37 14.83
Sorghum 1.6 14.41 28.04 16.38
Total cereals 8.8 78.23 144.96 84.69
Source: CSA (2009).
Systems, together with the Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which
promotes regional trade and investment, is
fostering the harmonisation of seed policies in
the region. As a member of these regional
organisations, Ethiopia has started reviewing the
way its seed policy will be harmonised with those
of neighbouring countries.
Much of the politics around cereal system seeds
revolve around the formal seed sector, as it is
assumed to be the sector which will narrow the
gap in cereal productivity levels between the
current (~12 quintals/ha) and potential
productivity levels (~30 quintals/ha). In recent
years, there has been a growing recognition that
agricultural technologies (and notably improved
seed) are available and can considerably improve
productivity. With much variability among the
different crops, the total supply of improved seed
in the country was only 27 per cent of the
officially estimated potential demand in 2005
(Spielman et al. 2010; Dawit Alemu and Spielman
2006). Supply is still far below demand, although
there are many efforts underway aimed at
increasing production and distribution by
strengthening the public and private sectors,
alongside promoting community-based seed
systems. A central strand of current policy
thinking is therefore the push to ‘modernise’ the
seed system, encouraging uptake of new varieties
as part of a strengthening of the formal seed
system. The narratives on crop productivity and
seed supply gaps therefore frame policy debates,
and drive a focus on modernisation and
formalisation of the seed system as part of the
overall GTP.
The remainder of this article explores the
political–economic dynamics which shape these
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Table 2 Major actors in the formal seed system and their role
Components of the seed system Institutions Regulatory bodies Regulatory measures
Plant breeding EIAR, RARIs, and HLIs MoARD Targets in terms of crop, 
improvement targets
Variety release NVRC MoARD Distinctiveness, uniformity and 
stability, uniqueness, value for
cultivation
Breeder seed production EIAR, RARIs, and HLIs Variety Maintaining Seed quality control
Research Centre
Pre-basic seed production EIAR, RARIs, HLIs and Seed quality control
ESE, OSE, ASE
Basic seed production ESE MoARD Seed quality control
Basic seed distribution and sale MoARD Fair distribution among regions
Certified seed production ESE, OSE, Private seed MoARD Seed quality control
companies
Farmer-based seed production ESE, BoARDs, NGOs BoARDs Seed quality control
and farmers
Seed distribution and sales ESE, OSE, ASE, BoARDs Price, quantity to respective 
Co-operatives, BoARDs buyers
Overall sight on the seed system National Seed MoARD/EIAR Planned production
Production and Fair distribution of different 
Distribution Committee classes of seed
Source Adapted from Zewdie Bishaw et al. (2008).
EIAR, Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research; RARI, Regional Agricultural Research Institute; HLIs, higher
learning institutes; NVRC, National Variety Release Committee; ESE, Ethiopian Seed Enterprise; OSE, Oromiya Seed
Enterprise; ASE, Amhara Seed Enterprise; BoARDs, Bureaus of Agriculture and Rural Development; MoARD,
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. 
policy discussions around the Ethiopian seed
system, focusing on three themes: (1) the central
role of the public sector in maintaining strategic
control over the seed sector through top-down,
state-led initiatives and coordination; (2) the
policy consequences of economic liberalisation
and the opening up of the seed sector to private
actors; and (3) the challenges and opportunities
associated with decentralised political
administration and efforts to established a truly
decentralised seed system.
The analysis is based on information generated
from secondary data sources and from primary
key informant interviews from a diverse group of
actors in the system, including farmers,
researchers, experts at Ethiopian Seed
Enterprise (ESE) and regional seed enterprises,
as well as the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development (MoARD) and the Bureau of
Agriculture and Rural Development (BoARD).
3 The Ethiopian cereal seed system: policies and
politics
The Ethiopian seed sector is governed by policies
stipulated in the different public proclamations
and regulations that were put in place since the
early 1990s (Dawit Alemu et al. 2010). The main
responsibility of implementing these policies is
given to MoARD at the federal level and to
Bureaus of Agriculture and Rural Development
(BoARDs) at regional level.
This section looks at two contrasting policy
initiatives: one driven centrally by the federal
government and the other more focused at the
local level centred on farmer-based seed
multiplication programmes.
3.1 The Crash Seed Multiplication Programme
The Crash Seed Multiplication Programme
(CSMP) was designed with the main objective of
alleviating the serious supply shortage of
improved seeds as compared to demand mainly
for hybrid maize. It started in the 2008/09
production season through mobilisation of all
relevant public sector institutions, including
MoARD, EIAR, ESE, and state farms in
multiplication of hybrid maize varieties starting
from breeder, pre-basic, basic and certified seed,
targeting the production of 730,000 quintals of
certified hybrid maize seed for the 2010
production season (MoARD 2009). The
programme is run by a National Seed
Multiplication and Distribution Committee
(NSMDC) composed of three members from
three institutions, i.e. from the Ethiopian
Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR),
Ethiopian Seed Enterprise (ESE) and
Agricultural Marketing Directorate of MoARD.
The CSMP involved assigning Bako Agricultural
Research Centre, the national centre of
excellence for maize research, to focus on the
production of breeder and pre-basic seed, and
the strengthening of the capacity of relevant
research centres to produce breeder, pre-basic
and basic seed twice per year using irrigation.
State farms were deployed for basic seed and
certified seed multiplication during both the off-
season and main season. Accordingly, about
10,000ha were prepared for planting and about
37 per cent of the prepared land was under
hybrid maize seed multiplication using
irrigation. This has increased the supply of
certified hybrid seed from about 87,000 quintals
in 2008/09 to 193,000 quintals in the 2010/11
production season (MoARD 2005–2010).
3.2 Farmer-based seed production and marketing
In contrast to the top-down, centrally driven
Crash programme, decentralised, locally run
farmer-based seed production and marketing
schemes (FBSPMS) are also being promoted.
Currently, the ESE, in collaboration with the
respective regional BoARD, is implementing the
schemes. The newly established seed enterprises
are also following suit in promoting seed
production, mainly for open-pollinated crop
varieties (OPVs) through a similar scheme
(Dawit Alemu and Tripp 2010).
These schemes improve the possibility of seed
production of locally demanded varieties and
crops for which there is less commercial interest.
There is also an increased possibility of
producing and marketing seed within
communities, so reducing seed costs (Yonas
Sahlu et al. 2008). Production sites can also serve
as demonstration sites, thereby possibly
enhancing the adoption of crop varieties.
Farmer Based Seed Multiplication (FBSM)
approaches are thus playing an important role in
the national seed system. In terms of the formal
seed system, they are the main source of raw seed
for the public seed enterprises. All the emerging
regional seed enterprises base the production of
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seed for OPV crops on FBSM and similarly, a
considerable amount of seed for ESE is produced
under FBSM, representing 19 per cent of the
total. Of the total 63 crop varieties produced by
ESE, 44 of them are also produced under FBSM.
Much of the seed produced under FBSM is reused
by farmers locally, resulting in low recovery rates
by seed enterprises. This is due to the limited
price incentives of the ESE compared to the black
market prices. Seed quality is also an issue
affecting FBSM, where on average 94 per cent of
the produced seed from cereals and about 80 per
cent from pulses was approved.
The FBSM strategy has offered an important
route to increasing seed availability through a
decentralised system, but there remain
challenges of sustainability. The system relies on
external support, intensive training of farmers,
and supervision, quality control and overall
management. Contract enforcement is difficult,
and price risks have to be borne.
These two initiatives represent the two ends of a
spectrum – from a decentralised, local approach,
to a centralised, command-oriented approach.
Both are seen as routes to addressing the crop
production and seed supply gaps, and so
responding to an Ethiopian vision of the Green
Revolution initiated through state planning and
support. What then are the underlying political
and economic factors that influence policy
outcomes in Ethiopia? The next section explores
three competing drivers.
4 The economic and political drivers of the
Ethiopian cereal seed system
In realising the Ethiopian Green Revolution,
three political–economic drivers pull in different
directions. These are the influence of top-down
state-driven initiatives; attitudes towards
agricultural liberalisation and the private sector
and the dynamics of political–administrative
decentralisation in Ethiopia. These combine to
shape Ethiopian seed policy and the form of
Ethiopia’s attempts at fostering a Green
Revolution.
4.1 Centrally driven state initiatives
Over many years, Ethiopia’s agricultural policy
framework has been dominated by a top-down,
centrally designed, state-directed approach. This
has been continuous from the Imperial regime,
through the Derg, and to the current political
setting. Whether the integrated rural development
programmes of the 1960s, the package
programmes of the 1970s, the villagisation
efforts of the 1980s or the input supply
programmes led by Sasakawa Global 2000 of the
1990s, all have seen a central role for the state in
directing rural development, organising delivery
and supplying technology. This remains the case
today, with the CSMP being a good example.
With agricultural production and food security so
high up on the political agenda, at present, the
main driver in the seed systems of the country is
related to the political decisions to increase and
sustain the agricultural growth that has been
achieved in the last five years, where the sector
has been growing more than 10 per cent annually.
The result has been a series of top-down
initiatives coming from federal level and
supported at the highest political levels. These
highlight the importance of technical and
institutional change – and the central role of
improved seeds in this. A major effort has
revolved around ‘Agricultural Technology Scaling-
up’ as part of the national initiative of ‘scaling-up
of best practices’, which includes wider
dissemination of already available agricultural
technologies (mainly improved crop varieties and
fertiliser) and continuous packaging and
validation of technologies; promoting the
involvement of the private sector, and working
together with donors and development partners.
There is a strong commitment that such
activities should have political leadership. Thus,
starting from the 2008/09 production season, top
policymakers at all levels (federal, regional,
zonal, woreda and kebele) are given as their
number one responsibility in promoting the
scaling-up of best practices in the agricultural
sectors the priority to ensure that improved
technologies (in particular, seeds and fertiliser)
reach farmers. This form of ‘command
agriculture’, linked to centrally defined targets,
is embedded in the evaluation criteria for
government officials, and in turn linked to
budget allocations and performance assessments.
With such strong political backing, this becomes
perhaps the number one driver of the seed
system. Directed by and through the central
state, it reinforces state control over the
agricultural system, and acts to pull into line
regional differences and diversity in a centrally
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managed planning system. While such politically
directed centralised initiatives are informed by
technical expertise, such technical designs are
sometimes overshadowed by political
imperatives, creating tensions between the
technocracy and the political system.
4.2 The private sector
The Ethiopian state has an ambivalent attitude
to economic liberalisation and the private sector.
While committed to opening up the economy and
attracting investment, directed state control is
always evident, as part of a carefully managed
transition. Currently, different incentives are
provided to support the private agricultural
investment, either through overall investment
incentives and/or seed sector-specific support.
These incentives are related to preferential
access to land, duty-free import of capital goods
and grace periods of up to five years on land
rents and tax holidays (MoTI 2007). In addition,
the government is supporting the organisation of
the private seed companies through the creation
of the Ethiopian Seed Growers and Processors’
Association. Although still weak, the association
is improving the engagement of emerging
private seed companies in the system.
While the private sector is growing, it remains
poorly integrated into the national seed
production and distributions system and focuses
only on particular seeds, i.e. hybrid maize in
some regions. Under the current set-up, all
private seed companies, except the multinational
private seed company, are dependent on the
public supply of source seed (basic seed) and also
have to align to the public distribution system.
Even the currently licensed private seed
companies who own parental lines for the
popular hybrid maize varieties remain aligned to
the public distribution channels and pricing
mechanism. This has created a disincentive for
the private seed companies to invest in
distribution channels and market outlets. This
discouragement also is the core reason for lack of
seed shops and retail outlets in Ethiopia, unlike
other countries where agro-dealers are central to
delivery systems.
The only multinational seed company operating
in Ethiopia is Pioneer Hi Bred Ethiopia, which
has its own source seed and some distribution
network. The major issue preventing increased
participation of multinationals in the Ethiopian
seed system is the financial regulation that limits
the repatriation of foreign currency. This
legislation has created a disincentive for most
multinationals interested in becoming involved
in the country’s seed system.
Emerging private seed companies are therefore
constrained by publicly dictated source seed
supply, limited business opportunities in
participating in OPV seed production due to low
demand, and only partially liberalised seed
markets. In practice, despite the policy rhetoric
and profile, the private sector remains weak and
fragmented, and state interests – particularly
those which are centrally directed with a strong
political push – continue to dominate the formal
seed sector. Tensions therefore exist between the
state and the emergent private sector. While
there has been much policy rhetoric about the
benefits of liberalisation in Ethiopia, the state
retains a strong hold over market actors, either
through market disincentives (e.g. price setting)
or limiting certain operations (e.g. distribution).
Again, the argument of the strategic importance
of food and agriculture and the perceived weak
presence of the private sector is deployed to
argue for strong state control, even in notionally
privatised operations.
4.3 The decentralised political–administrative system
Constitutionally, Ethiopia has a strong
commitment to a decentralised
political–administrative system. This means the
agricultural and rural development efforts are
decentralised to the respective regional states
under the general national policy framework.
The seed system in the country is also becoming
decentralised, following the emergence of
Regional Agricultural Research Institutes
(RARIs) in the late 1990s and Regional Seed
Enterprises (RSEs) in early 2009, where the role
of ESE as a sole public seed enterprise is ceasing.
Two regional Seed Enterprises, namely the
Oromiya Seed Enterprise (OSE) and Amhara
Seed Enterprise (ASE) were established by their
respective regional governments in December
2009. Southern Nations, Nationalities and
Peoples Region (SNNPR) also established the
South Seed Enterprise in early 2010.
The experience so far shows that the
decentralisation of the seed system has both
opportunities and challenges. The opportunities
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are related to: better research coverage of the
different agro-ecologies; improved possibility of
expanding the production and marketing of seed
for all crops; improving the human and physical
capacity at regional level; improving the
possibility of producing locally demanded crop
varieties; and the possibility of marketing at
relatively lower cost due to reduced cost of
transportation. The challenges are related to:
the need for strong national coordination of
agricultural research and development, seed
production and marketing activities for better
efficiency and creation of institutional synergies;
avoiding unnecessary competition among the
three regional seed enterprises for the same
resources, such as facilities, human resources
and markets; and if the regional seed enterprises
are to serve only their respective regions, the
role of ESE will need to be redefined as a
national seed enterprise.
Since 2008, centralised approaches like the
CSMP have also come into tension with the
decentralised political–administrative system
and the decentralised seed system. While highly
controlled in many ways (centrally set targets,
central appropriation of source seeds, etc.), there
remains room for manoeuvre within the regional
system, with bureaus of agriculture and local
regional politicians having some important areas
of autonomy (like setting regional targets,
independent planning for established regional
seed enterprises, etc.). Thus, parallel efforts may
emerge with federal and regional state-level
initiatives running side by side.
These three drivers therefore interact to create a
particular political–economic setting for
policymaking on seeds and agricultural
development in Ethiopia. The result is a very
particular style of ‘Green Revolution’ in
Ethiopia, one that differs in important respects
from other countries in the region. The role of
the state remains central, and the private sector,
in the context of decentralised
political–administrative systems is deployed in
line with broad objectives set by the state.
5 Conclusion
Across each of the elements of the seed system –
from breeding, to source seed maintenance and
multiplication, to basic seed and certified seed
production and distribution to price setting – the
state dominates, with its mandate for production
and distribution, as well as regulation. The
private sector is encouraged to play a more active
role in the system, but in reality, its efforts have
been fairly circumscribed due to market
disincentives or limitation of certain operations.
The historical origins of the current top-down,
centrally designed state-directed approach to seed
production and distribution can be traced from
the Imperial regime through the Derg period to
the current political setting. In all modern
political eras, the Ethiopian cereal seed system
has followed the same approach, with the public
sector dominating the formal seed system. The
principal target of the system was to serve the
needs of large-scale state farms and farmers’
cooperatives and fill the gap left by a weak private
sector. This bias is still influencing overall policy
and planning within the national seed system.
In the last two decades, strong central political
leadership committed to growth through
agricultural productivity has pushed a vision of a
Green Revolution generated by state initiative,
supported, in carefully controlled ways, by a
partially liberalised private sector. This includes
the development of high-yielding varieties of
cereal grains, expansion of irrigation
infrastructure, facilitation of private agricultural
investment and distribution of hybrid seeds,
synthetic fertilisers and pesticides to farmers. It
is argued that this public–private arrangement is
the most effective way of stimulating a Green
Revolution, and ensuring broad-based
agriculture-led growth (MoFED 2006).
But, as the article has shown, there are limits to
this very particular vision of an Ethiopian Green
Revolution. For example, in recent years,
following a number of major state-led efforts
that have mobilised researchers, civil servants
and regional officials across the country, it was
realised that there was a serious shortage of
improved technologies, especially seed. The
supply shortages arise from the limited capacity
of both public and private seed producers and
suppliers. Moreover, there is weak coordination
and linkages among actors in the system for seed
development, production, multiplication and
distribution. Yet it is clear that highly productive
technologies require intensive and effective
mechanisms for complex coordination and
exchange, to allow investment in and operation
of different specialised activities. These
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mechanisms in turn require an effective
institutional environment to govern them
(Dorward et al. 2005).
Currently, there is no workable national action
plan for seed sector development in Ethiopia. The
seed quality control system as well as the
distribution of breeder, pre-basic and basic seed
by NARS are uncoordinated. Furthermore, there
is inefficient demonstration and popularisation of
newly released varieties by the national public
system. Contracts are also poorly enforced within
the system, especially those contractual
agreements between the public sector and private
seed companies, ESE and seed-producing
farmers, and seed companies and seed-
multiplying farms. The problems are also
exacerbated by the limited production and
storage capacity of the public seed companies,
and the performance of the private seed
companies. The public Ethiopian Seed Enterprise
(ESE) has an insufficient availability of irrigable
land for public production of seed, while the
private seed companies focus only on hybrid seed,
especially hybrid maize, where there is a sizeable
demand and an opportunity to turn a profit. The
existence of leftover basic seed by some private
companies and the sale of seed through the black
market by underreporting the amount of seed
produced also undermine policy objectives.
Tensions exist between the technocracy and the
political system, especially when technical
designs are overshadowed by political
imperatives, sometimes misdirecting priorities
and investments away from the people and
places that need them the most. Centralised
approaches have also come into conflict with the
decentralised political–administrative system
which has sought to promote a decentralised
seed system, in part due to the emergence of
parallel federal and regional state-level
initiatives running side by side. These have led to
duplication of effort, wasting of limited resources
and unnecessary turf battles. Finally, tensions
exist between the state and the emergent private
sector as the state seeks to liberalise the sector,
while retaining a strong hold over the market.
With such a singular vision, supported by a
strong coalition of state and external donor and
investor interests, there is a danger of a
narrowing of priorities and potentially a ‘lock-in’
to a limited set of technological–managerial
solutions serving particular interests to the
exclusion of others. Technology pathways in
Ethiopia, with the focus on hybrid varieties and
the formal seed system, are increasingly being
fashioned by global funding and special interests,
sometimes resulting in a lack of involvement of
wider stakeholders. Thus, there is a danger that
the diverse livelihood pathways and associated
agricultural technology demands of the country’s
millions of smallholder farmers may not always
be well served.
In some quarters, the limits of centrally directed,
state-led planning have been realised, with a
growing recognition of the importance of private
sector actors and new experiments with farmer-
based seed multiplication and marketing
systems. This has led to important recent
changes in policy and practice related to
licensing out of basic seed multiplication to both
public and private seed companies, expansion of
the seed production capacity of public seed
enterprises and the promotion of specialisation
in the production of the different classes of seed.
As policy in this area develops, we must always
remember that the political economy of hunger
and poverty looms large in Ethiopia. This
continues to focus considerable political
attention on increasing economic growth and
food security through improved agricultural
productivity, with seeds playing a central role in
that agenda. This is not just a technical agenda –
about new seeds and delivery systems – but one
very fundamentally linked to issues of national
political economy, and as such, worthy of debate
beyond the narrow confines of technical–
economic assessments.
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